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I. INTRODUCTION

In the spirit of remembering the 200-year legacy of England's abolition of the transatlantic slave trade in 1807 and the 150-year legacy of
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Scott v. Sandford' in 1857, this
Essay comments on the relationship between international migration
and citizenship. Specifically, it uses the theme of the Texas Wesleyan
University School of Law and the University of Gloucestershire's
Fourth Annual Summer Legal Conference, "Law and Justice in the
Age of Globalization: Marking the 200th Anniversary of Britain's Abt Associate Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, Orange, California. The Author thanks John Tehranian for comments on earlier drafts; Dean
John Eastman, Kevin Johnson, Erika George, and Rose Cuison Villazor for their
scholarly suggestions; Dean Eastman for the law school's financial support; comments
from co-panelists from the "Citizenship, Barriers, & Borders" panel at the Fourth
Annual Gloucester Summer Legal Conference and from participants at the Harvard
Law School European Research Center workshop, Chapman University COTES
workshop, Third World and International Law (TWAIL) III at the Albany Law
School, and the 2007 Law and Society Conference at the Humboldt University, Germany; and Research Assistant Vanessa Nguyen for her vital support.
1. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
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olition of the Slave Trade (1807), ' '2 to analyze the historical and global
migration of persons and how responding to this domestic law reimagines national identity in the form of citizenship. This Essay's objective is to provide international and cultural contexts to legal determinations of who is (or is not) a citizen. 3 Citizenship is studied as one
example, but not the only example, of national identity.4 This is done
by looking at nineteenth-century instances from the U.S. slavery and
Chinese migration experiences and current examples of birthright citizenship in the United States and dual-nationality in Mexico. A quick
view of the slavery and Chinese Exclusion histories shows these legal
citizenship determinations occurred 150 and 110 years ago (Dred Scott
and United States v. Wong Kim Ark,5 respectively), in response to
prior global migration. Similarly, current citizenship issues in U.S.
and Mexican law developed from changes in U.S. migration policy
2. See Conference Announcement and Call for Papers: Fourth Annual Gloucester Conference, http://www.gloucesterconference.com/callforpapers.asp (last visited
Feb. 27, 2008).
3. For this Essay, "legal citizenship determinations" refers to when the judiciary
decides who is or is not a citizen. This Essay's goal is to comment on migration and
national identity in citizenship. It presents migration as a global or transnational process. This commentary is mostly inspired by the concurrent anniversaries in the year
2007 of the Dred Scott case and Great Britain's abolition of the slave trade, which
were two hundred and one hundred and fifty years ago, respectively. This Essay's
primary objective is to raise scholarly inquiry on issues of migration and citizenship.
Specifically, citizenship determination may be heavily influenced by culture, which
often happens after the global process of migration. With this objective, this Essay is
more focused on posing scholarly questions and finding commonalities in historical
events, as opposed to making fully researched doctrinal claims on citizenship and
migration.
4. Following Linda Bosniak's detailed and sophisticated analysis in The Citizen
and the Alien, this Essay refers to citizenship as a "community's boundary," which
designates a community's belonging, exclusivity and closure. See LINDA BOSNIAK,
THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 2 (2006).
See also Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2450-51
(2007) (referring to citizenship's "border-conscious," presumption of "national outsiders," and characteristics of "passports and nationality"). This domain exists along
with citizenship's "internal" focus on the "nature and quality of relations" among
community members. BOSNIAK, supra at 1-2. The former refers to citizenship's outer
domain and the later to its inward domain. See id. The inward domain examines
citizenship's rights and benefits (i.e. "what is citizenship") while the outward examination identifies citizenship's boundaries (i.e., "who is a citizen" and "where" citizenship
is determined). See id. at 12-16. This Essay does not focus on the inward analysis.
Instead, it uses interpretive tools from cultural analysis, i.e., Benedict Anderson and
Eric Wolf, to track the social constructions of citizenship embedded in legal interpretation responding to global migrations such as slavery to the United States, Chinese
migration to the United States, and recent migration inbound to the United States
and outbound from Mexico. For an excellent description of how citizenship implies
both inequality and exclusion in both current and historical context, see generally
Ediberto RomAn, The Citizenship Dialectic, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 557 (2006)
(presenting citizenship determinations as applied historically to inhabitants of U.S.
territory/colonies, African-Americans, and Native-Americans, and as currently applied to persons of color in the "War on Terror").
5. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
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twenty years ago, i.e., the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986 (IRCA). This Essay is written in the year 2007, which inspires
scholarly reflection of events in 1807, 1857, and 1898.
These cases illustrate how domestic law is forced by global
processes to determine who is or is not a citizen. The decisions made
in Dred Scott came after more than two centuries of slave trade to the
United States. Similarly, in the last two decades of the nineteenth
century, the U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding the Chinese Exclusion measures took place after Chinese immigration to the U.S. began to increase in 1868. Likewise, Mexico's incorporation of dualnationality for its citizens in 1997 and political and public calls to revisit birthright citizenship in the U.S. both come after steady increases
in Mexico-U.S. migration. For the last twenty years, economic markets in the U.S. and in Mexico (bilateral demand and supply factors)
and U.S. border policy have fed this increased presence of foreign nationals in the U.S. These trends lead to unauthorized migrants in the
U.S. Children born to these migrants in U.S. territory are entitled to
"birthright citizenship." Established U.S. legal interpretation entails
that these children are U.S. citizens when born in U.S. territory, even
if their parents are not "legally" in the U.S. This interpretation is continually contested as the "illegal" migrant presence grows consequent
6
to economic practices and border policies.
First, this Essay argues that these four examples of migration (slave
trade, Chinese migration, Mexico emigration and U.S. immigration)
show how domestic law (re)determines citizenship standards after sustained exposure to the global movement of persons, e.g., the transatlantic slave trade (which ended in the early nineteenth century),
Chinese migration to the U.S. (beginning in the later part of the same
century), and Mexico-U.S. migration (increasing steadily since the
1980s). Even though they are distinct, these three migrations are part
of global processes. By global, I mean these developments are not
unilaterally caused or felt. This is the case with slavery representing
openly racist mindsets and brutal notions of property; treaty-induced
Chinese migration developing from U.S. imperial ventures in Asia and
in the western parts of the American continent; and the market-driven
U.S. migrant-pull and Mexico migrant-push.

6. Recent examples of bills seeking to overturn or limit birthright citizenship include: The Citizenship Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 698, 109th Cong. (2005) (denying
citizenship at birth for children born in the United States to noncitizens or permanent
residents); The Citizenship Reform Act of 1995, H.R. 1363, 104th Cong. (1995) (denying citizenship at birth for children born in the United States to noncitizens or permanent residents); H.R. 705, 104th Cong. (1995) (no short title provided) (limiting
citizenship at birth to children born to a mother who is a citizen or a legal resident of
the United States). Proposed constitutional amendments limiting citizenship at birth
to children of U.S. citizens or authorized migrants include H.R.J. Res. 56, 104th Cong.
(1995); H.R.J. Res. 129, 103rd Cong. (1993); H.R.J. Res. 117, 103rd Cong. (1993).
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Second, this Essay contends that these legal determinations, each in
distinct historical periods, reflect cultural processes of "imagined communities," borrowing the concept from Benedict Anderson. 7 The process by which U.S. or Mexican law defines who is a citizen comes after
cultural notions determine who is (or is not) part of the political community. The legal decision of who is (or is not) a citizen is illustrative
of this mix of cultural imagination and legal determination. With

these averments, this Essay provides a small global, historical, and cultural contribution to recent legal scholarship on migration and
citizenship.8
An overarching goal of the following paragraphs is to contextualize
legal issues from the nineteenth century and from current debates.
This conceptual environment, wherein law must determine the normative standards of domestic citizenship, is both cultural and global. In

other words, legal decisions on citizenship are not made without the
influence of forces outside national territory. Similarly, these decisions do not occur without changes in communal or shared values, i.e.,
culture.9 Instead, the Essay shows two things. First, legal determina-

tions of citizenship (both current and historic) take place amongst a
political and legal interplay between domestic and foreign influences.
Second, this conceptual interplay rests on a cultural context deciding

who is or is not within a political community. The first point is evident
in legal citizenship determinations. The second point illuminates an
"imagined community" implicit in the legal reasoning. Accordingly,
7. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6 (rev. ed. 2006).
8. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 40-43 (1975) (rejecting the traditional scholarship notion that citizenship is of limited importance in
U.S. constitutional law). See also Kevin R. Johnson, Race Matters: Immigration Law
and Policy Scholarship,Law in the Ivory Tower, and the Legal Indifference of the Race
Critique, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 525, 543-44 (2000); Kevin R. Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations:A "Magic Mirror" into the Heartof Darkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1153 (1998). Gordon and Lenhardt show the applicability of
Critical Race Theory legal scholarship's examination of "second class citizenship" and
inequality in immigration and citizenship research. See generally Jennifer Gordon &
R.A. Lenhardt, Citizenship Talk: Bridging the Gap Between Immigration and Race
Perspectives, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2493, 2494 (2007) (providing a review of immigration legal scholarship on citizenship and summarizing immigration law scholarship's
focus on citizenship's exclusionary effects, varied location between national and supranational jurisdictions, legal foundations, attainment or naturalization process, increased acceptance of dual-nationality or dual-citizenship, and post-national or
transnational characteristics).
9. For a working definition of "culture," this Essay uses William Roseberry's focus on culture and politics, economics, and history. Roseberry's lens looks at cultural
meaning and inequalities. See WILLIAM ROSEBERRY, ANTHROPOLOGIES AND HISTORIES: ESSAYS IN CULTURE, HISTORY, AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 13-14 (1989). Roseberry examines culture as developing from "social and political actors" having their
actions formed "in part by preexisting understandings of the world, of other people,
of the self," which is influenced by "social and political inequalities" and "historical
formation." See id. Accordingly, history and political economics affect "actors' differential understandings of the world, other people, and themselves .... " Id.
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the Essay is not primarily focused on the substantive law that develops
from slavery, Chinese migration, or current immigration to the U.S.
Instead, the Essay points to a larger arena (both in terms of time period and geographic scope examined) from which legal citizenship determinations arise. These determinations include the historic
examples of Dred Scott and Wong Kim Ark and more recent experiences with birthright citizenship in the U.S. and dual-nationality in
Mexico.
To expand on this, Section I summarizes cultural studies' approaches to national identity and global analysis. This includes two,
but by no means exclusive, influences. First is Anderson's Imagined
Communities:Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, arguing that nations are "imagined communities. 0 Second is Eric
Wolf's Europe and the People Without History," presenting how world
history is characterized by transnational connections between communities and how this history often overlooks perspectives from
migrants.
These theoretical approaches motivate this Essay to ask the following about legal citizenship determinations: (a) what is the global
movement in persons that leads to the citizenship question?; and (b)
what is the imagined community articulated by the legal determination of citizenship? From these questions, a legal inquiry into national
identity and citizenship gains historical, global, and cultural perspectives. The next three sections briefly describe the examples of slavery,
Dred Scott, and citizenship; Chinese migration to the U.S., Chinese
Exclusion measures, and citizenship; and citizenship as seen from a
migration experience of U.S.-pull and Mexico-push. For each of the
cases their respective sections, Sections II through IV, present these
legal citizenship determinations and then identify relevant global migration and imagined community contexts.

II.

GLOBAL MIGRATION AND RE-IMAGINING NATIONAL IDENTITY

The global movement of persons results in domestic legal systems
eventually re-imagining who is entitled to citizenship. Large-scale inbound or outbound migration, whether in today's "globalized world"
or in previous periods such as the "age of migration, 1 2 results in new
determinations of legal issues regarding citizenship. To explore these
claims, this Essay incorporates theoretical approaches from cultural
studies and world-systems theory, painting a context that is global and
10. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 6.
11. ERIC R. WOLF, EUROPE AND THE
fornia Press, rev. Preface 1997).
12. See STEPHEN CASTLES & MARK J.

PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY

(Univ. of Cali-

MILLER, THE AGE OF MIGRATION: INTERNATIONAL POPULATION MOVEMENTS IN THE MODERN WORLD (Guillford Press 2003)

(describing international migration as a global process).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

5

Texas
Wesleyan
Law Review, Vol.
14 [2022],
Iss. 2, Art. 6
TEXAS
WESLEYAN
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. 14

cultural. 3 These theoretical suggestions elaborate on the macro
causes of the four cases examined.' 4 These theoretical inquiries
pinpoint a unit of analysis focused on the transnational connections in
a global world (i.e., migration). They also elucidate the subject of cultural re-imagination of national identity (migration and citizenship).
To begin, anthropologist Eric Wolf in Europe and People Without
History offers an approach that examines transnational connections in
a global world, without solely focusing on nation-states. 15 His approach adds a transnational focus, or a focus less centered on states, to
world-systems theory. This theory traditionally characterizes world
history as part of a core-periphery dynamic, with Europe starting as
the core and expanding its influence worldwide. As this influence expands, the periphery is dependent on the core's demand for resources
and the core's supply of manufactured goods and capital. As such, the
center feeds off the periphery. He explains how the expansion of European economic power from the sixteenth century onward should be
studied with less emphasis on state action and the core as sole agents
of change. 6 Instead, he urges increased analytical reference to the
interconnections between societies and on the perspectives of communities before their exposure to the core's influence. 7 In this light, his
history examines what moves transnationally irrespective of national
borders. This initially includes the mercantile search for silver, slave
routes, fur, sugar, and other products. These transnational connections continue in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century with
the search for labor, which spurs mass global migration.1 8 Illuminat13. "World-systems" refers to the social science approach that international interactions are mostly defined by a disunion in power between the core/center and the
periphery, with the core/center benefiting from the periphery's labor and contribution. See IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, WORLD-SYSTEMS ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION
11-17 (3rd prtg. 2005). This approach highlights the transnational nature or interconnectedness of politics, economics, history, and culture between nation-states. See id.
Often this approach identifies world-economies or world-empires operating beyond
the reach of one state or a region of the world. See id. at 17, 57. The approach
examines how in different regions of the world, there is often a core/center and periphery relationship between nation-states. See id. at 11-17; see generally IMMANUEL
WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM: CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE EUROPEAN WORLD-ECONOMY IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY (1974)

(describing a world-system as a social system).
14. See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY ET

AL., WORLDS IN MOTION: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AT THE END OF THE MILLENNIUM 34-42
(Clarendon Press 2005) (1998) [hereinafter MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION]

(emphasizing global and macro economic causes for international migration's initiation); ALEJANDRO PORTES & JOHN WALTON, LABOR, CLASS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 4-6 (Charles Tilly & Edward Shorter eds., 1981) (discussing the
"World-systems" theory, which provides global explanations for many migration issues and pinpoints how macro and economic changes in production and consumption
(in the core/center) disrupt local labor markets (in the periphery)).
15. See WOLF, supra note 11, at 4.
16. See id. at 22-23.
17. See id. at 3-4, 22-23.
18. See id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol14/iss2/6
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ing analysis traditionally disregarded, Wolf refers to the perspectives
of societies before and after the world-system's capitalist expansion. 9
He also focuses on the actual interconnections, in the form of economic transactions or labor movements, between communities.2" This
last point includes the large-scale historic migration of labor in the
form of the transatlantic slave trade and migrants from Asia and from
Europe to North America, South America, South Africa, and
Oceania.2 '
Wolf's focus on studying world history by focusing less on state action is often presented with the "global pool hall" analogy. 22 He explains that global interactions are often presented with "nations,
societies, or culture" as being "internally homogeneous and externally
distinctive," as if they were billiard balls; "nations, societies, or culture," then "spin off each other" like "hard and round billiard balls. 2 3
Instead, he argues there are important connections and movement between nations, societies, and culture. 24 Taking cue from Wolf's search
for interconnections and histories denied, this Essay charts national
identity as it changed after slavery, Chinese migration, and inbound
and outbound migration between Mexico and the U.S. These three
large-scale movements in persons resemble Wolf's examination of interconnectedness between nation-states and communities.
Building from this macro and global analysis, this Essay tracks how
citizenship is legally determined based on social constructions. The
four cases studied suggest how domestic law constructs the idea of
"who is a citizen and belongs" and "who is not a citizen and therefore
is not a member." As such, migration leads to important questions of
national identity. Offering cultural nuances to macro examinations,
Anderson describes the nation as "an imagined political community"
that is "imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."2 6 It is
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. Id. (explaining that the spread of global capitalism impacts the world supply of
resources and creates working classes that migrate between continents).
22. See id. at 6-7.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. The issue of migration and national identity received great scholarly, political,
and public attention in response to Samuel P. Huntington's 2004 work Who Are We?
The Challenges To America's National Identity, which argued that migration from
Mexico threatens the United States's Anglo-Saxon culture, leading to ethnic strife as
evident in Balkan Europe during the 1990s. See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong
Hing, National Identity in a MulticulturalNation: The Challenge of Immigration Law
and Immigrants, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1347, 1349-51 (2005) (reviewing Huntington and
agreeing national identity is central to a discussion of immigration, but illustrating
how migrants do assimilate despite claims of Anglo-Saxon culture's static currency
and how policies should promote assimilation instead of suggesting to stop
migration).
26. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 6. This Essay uses Anderson's concept of
"imagined communities" for three reasons. First, the concept focuses on the nation as
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"imagined" because the members of this community can never know
all of its members. This imagination creates the idea of a nation in
situations where all members can not know each other. As such, the
criteria for membership of a nation is conceived or imagined. The
community is built from this "imagination." Its "limitation" stems
from how the community cannot be infinite or without borders; instead, the community requires a finite demarcation. Since "imagination" constructs the idea of the community its borders are elastic or
not permanent. Developing from nation-states versus divine orders,
universal religious vision, or dynastic monarchies, this identity is an
outgrowth from sovereignty. As states rid themselves of imperial, dynastic, or religious control, their sovereignty provided this freedom.
At a more individual level, the imagination of the community rests on
personal attachments along with state sovereignty. z7 The imagination
is of a "community" because the nation is conceived as a "deep and
horizontal comradeship., 28 There is a sense of fraternity in the community, despite inequality or exploitation.
an idea that is created, invented, and changed over time. Id. at 4. This facilitates this
Essay's examination of the law of citizenship and its response to migrations in three
periods of history. Second, Anderson's focus is quite cultural, instead of viewing the
state or politics as solely responsible for nationalism. Id. at 4, 7, 12. This helps identify the cultural values that many legal citizenship determinations rely on. Third, because his concepts are so popular and readily accessible across disciplines and outside
the United States, id. at 207, it best suits this Essay's objectives of introducing new
questions along a broad scope. By no means does this Essay incorporate Anderson's
more elaborate discussions on the origin and spread of nationalism, but instead it
merely uses his basic definition of the nation. See id. at 4. Anderson's thesis and
explanation about the origins of the nation are not without serious criticism from
perspectives emphasizing historical, post-colonial, and discriminatory (racial, caste,
gender, or class) perspectives. See, e.g., PARTHA CHATrERJEE, NATIONALIST
THOUGHT AND THE COLONIAL WORLD: A DERIVATIVE DISCOURSE 19-22, 50-51
(Univ. of Minn. Press 1993) (1986) (emphasizing three stages (departure, maneuver,
and arrival) of Indian and possible post-colonial nationalism and questioning Anderson's thesis on print-capital origins of nationalism); Akhil Gupta, Imagining Nations,
in A COMPANION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF POLITICS 267, 268-80 (David Nugent &
Joan Vincent eds., 2007) (presenting many of the contentions from scholars of nationalism both before and after Anderson's ideas and then comparing Anderson's modular and process approach to Partha Chatterjee's perspectives on the events that
characterize Indian nationalism); CLAUDIO LOMNITZ, Nationalism as a PracticalSystem: Benedict Anderson's Theory of Nationalism from the Vantage Point of Spanish
America, in DEEP MEXICO, SILENT MEXICO: AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF NATIONALISM

3, 3 (2001) (questioning the Creole origins of the concept of a nation as coming from
Spanish-American colonies and emphasizing the nation as "a community that is conceived of as deep comradeship among full citizens, each of whom is a potential broker
between the national state and weak, embryonic or partial citizens who he or she can
construe as dependents ...").
27. Anderson states that the "cultural roots of nationalism" explains why millions
of persons are willing to die for the nation. ANDERSON, supra note 7, at 1, 7. As an
expert of Asian politics and culture, id. at acknowledgment, his inquiry is sparked by
how and why Vietnam and Cambodia in 1978 went to war even though both states
were Marxist at the time, id. at xi.
28. Id. at 7.
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Taking these theoretical elaborations, this Essay uses the concept of
imagined communities to illuminate how legal issues of citizenship develop from the global movement of persons. 29 As explained below,
legal determinations on citizenship must imagine its community's
members in the global context of the transatlantic slave trade, Chinese
migration resultant to U.S. commerce with China, and recent demandand-supply economics spurring Mexico-U.S. migration. With these
theoretical suggestions, this Essay identifies how legal determinations
of citizenship are influenced by the history of global migration and the
cultural process of imagining communities.
III.

200

YEARS,

150

YEARS, AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP: ENDING THE

TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND THEN
IMAGINING IN DRED ScoTr

This Essay is written as a reflection on two important events in history: England's abolition of the slave trade in 1807 (which was 200
years ago) and the U.S. Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision in 1857
(which was 150 years ago). 30 These events illustrate how the global
migration in persons eventually results in domestic determinations of
who is entitled to citizenship or not. Examining these two events together shows how there is first a movement in persons across national
borders (i.e., Africa to the U.S.), and then later in history (i.e., Dred
Scott) national identity is imagined to include (or not) descendents
from this migration. The Essay identifies first a transnational movement in people and then later the domestic question of citizenship.
The slave trade encompassed the violent, brutal, and genocidal
movement of people from Africa to the Western Hemisphere by European forces. This displacement began in the sixteenth century as a
way to provide labor for imperial industries throughout the hemisphere, including the U.S., the Caribbean, Central America, and
South America.3 1 As Spain, France, Portugal, and England developed
29. For a more thorough analysis of the relationship between citizenship and culture, see generally Leti Volpp, The Culture of Citizenship, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
IN L. 571, 571 (2007) (demonstrating how the law often imagines the citizen as "modern and motivated by reason" and the "cultural other is assumed to be traditional and
motivated by culture" using the example of illegality of headscarves in contemporary
French schools).
30. With slavery, these events are fifty years apart, occurring in 1807 and 1857.
Examples explored below show this difference in time can decrease with analogous
processes later in the nineteenth century Chinese migration (thirty years between
1868 and 1898) and Mexico-U.S. migration (twenty-plus years between 1986 and the
present).
31. See WOLF, supra note 11, at 195-231; see generally David Eltis, Free and Coerced Migrationsfrom the Old World to the New, in COERCED AND FREE MIGRATION:
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 33, 39 (David Eltis ed., 2002) (providing a history of the transatlantic slave trade); HERBERT S. KLEIN, AFRICAN SLAVERY IN LATIN AMERICA AND
THE CARIBBEAN (1986) (covering the origins of the American slave system, the life of
slaves in slave societies, and the transition from slavery to freedom).
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enormous colonial enterprises producing silver, sugar, tobacco, coffee,
and other products, Africans supplied vital labor for these ventures.
Without slave labor these empires would have failed economically.
While the U.S. ceased being a colony in the late eighteenth century, it
continued using slavery as a labor system until the Civil War's end in
1865. England abolished the trade or transport of slaves from Africa
to the Americas in 1807. The next year the U.S. ended the importation, but would continue with slavery as a labor system until 1865.
Remembering these events, from 200 and 150 years ago, illustrates
how slavery was slowly dismantled and how this process was global. It
shows a belated sense of the political liberalism's optimism, as the ideals of the Enlightenment and republican citizenship were not old in
1807 and 1857, but they were also not new. An important caveat to
the concept of liberal citizenship was race, since the ideals of political
participation and republican government implicitly and explicitly excluded persons of African descent.32 After 300 years of the slave
trade and over six million persons moved from Africa to the Americas
(with millions dying in the jailed journey across the Atlantic), the dismantling of the slave trade began in 1807.
These developments were undoubtedly global and transnational.
People were enslaved in the African continent and used for labor in
the Americas. For centuries, England and other European empires
used their military and commercial power to move millions of people.
The European force, derived and sustained from the world-system's
core, kept millions of people enslaved as needed for the imperial
economies. Enslavement and labor in the periphery provided economic gains and capital for Europe to industrialize. Similarly, politics
in the form of abolition and liberalism in the European core slowly
dismantled the transatlantic slave trade. In sum, slavery as a labor
system was a challenge for political liberalism and a process developed transnationally, with causes and effects on both sides of the
Atlantic.
Fifty years after England abolished the slave trade in Dred Scott
domestic U.S. law made a significant determination on citizenship regarding persons of African descent. These persons were effectively
only two generations removed from 1807. In this case, the basic inquiry was: whether a person of African descent who was free, i.e., not
a slave, could be a U.S. citizen? The Court answered no. 33 The decision determined who was a member of the U.S. political community.
32. For instance, the Naturalization Act of 1790 limited citizenship through naturalization to "all free white person[s]." An Act To Establish an Uniform Rule of
Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). Another example is the Naturalization Act of
1870, which included persons of "African descent" but effectively denied this to Chinese. See An Act to Amend the Naturalization Laws and to Punish Crimes Against
the Same, and for Other Purposes, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254, 256 (1870).
33. See Scott, 60 U.S. 393 at 404, 406.
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In order to accomplish this, the law had to imagine what were citizenship's inclusive and exclusive boundaries. The relevance of this decision to this Essay is: it came after a long-term global movement of
persons and it required the law to imagine the boundaries of national
identity.
The decision in Dred Scott held that persons of African descent,
whether they were slaves or freed persons, could never be U.S. citizens.34 Chief Justice Roger Taney wrote the majority opinion.35 Justices Benjamin Curtis and John McLean authored two dissenting
opinions.36 Chief Justice Taney hoped that the decision would settle
the larger issues regarding the legal constitutionality of slavery and
remedy political and ideological divisions.3 7 Instead, the decision did
quite the contrary and inflamed tensions that erupted into the Civil
War four years later in 1861,
with the notion of legal slavery fueling
38
Southern state secession.
The decision imagined the U.S. political community by negatively
demarcating those individuals who could not be citizens. Explicitly,
for the Court these limits did not include blacks as possible citizens.
The Chief Justice wrote that African-Americans were regarded as "an
inferior order," "unfit to associate with the white race," and "so far
inferior, that they had no rights which white man was bound to respect."3 9 He added, "the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced
to slavery for his benefit."4 It denied the plaintiff Dred Scott the
rights of citizenship even though previously his slave owner had freed
him and he was not a slave during the proceedings.4 1 The Constitution, which had been in effect for over sixty years, had not determined
whether persons of African descent could be citizens.
To reach its decision, the Court had to envision who could be a
member of the citizenship community and what were the inherent limits of this community. The opinion accomplished this imagination and
demarcation with two cultural steps. First, it claimed blacks were inferior and were not entitled to rights of citizenship enjoyed by a white
and civilized world.42 This step imagines who is and is not part of a
community. This imagination was required since the Constitution did
not textually state, "slaves or descendents of slaves, or persons of Af34. See id. at 404-406.
35. Id. at 399.
36. Id. at 529, 564.
37. See Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism'sForgotten
Past, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 151 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (explaining how the ruling itself became a political issue, while attempting to resolve the political issue of slavery in the territories).
38. See id.
39. Scott, 60 U.S. at 407.
40. Id.
41. See Eisgruber, supra note 37, at 153-54 (explaining the process of freeing Dred
Scott occurred when the slave owner traveled to a "free state" with the slave).
42. See Scott, 60 U.S. at 404-05.
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rican descent may be citizens." 4 3 Taney explained that the Constitu-

tion did not confer citizenship to African-Americans. He wrote they
were "not included, and were not intended to be included, under the
word 'citizens' in the Constitution" and "therefore [they can] claim
none of the rights and privileges" of citizenship." He added they
were "considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who
had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated
or not, yet remained subject to their authority."45 The opinion
claimed that African-Americans did not qualify for the definitions of
"people of the United States," political communities, or "citizens" as
included in the Constitution.46 Instead, for the Dred Scott Court, the
Constitution regards persons of African descent as a "separate class of
persons" and not as a "portion
of the people or citizens of the Gov47
ernment then formed.
As its second cultural step, the Court implicitly held persons of African descent were property when it found Congress had violated
states' rights when it outlawed slavery in the western territories.48 In
the latter point, the Court found slave owners were entitled to due
process protections for their slave property. 49 This means that persons of African descent were property, for which a slave owner enjoyed due process protection. It explained because the Constitution
"recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes
no distinction between that description of property and other property" then it could not deny protection for this property.5"
IV.

110

YEARS, CHINESE MIGRATION, AND WONG KIM ARK:

IMAGINING CITIZENSHIP IN NEW GLOBAL CONTEXTS
FOR THE U.S. AND CHINA

Like the centuries-long transatlantic slave trade, Chinese migration
to the U.S. developed as part of a larger global process. This migration eventually led to a legal re-definition of citizenship in the U.S.
with Wong Kim Ark. This decision confirmed birthright citizenship in
43. The Constitution does not provide a definition of "citizen" or "citizenship." In
1790, Congress passed the first law providing for naturalization of aliens and extending citizenship to children born abroad to U.S. citizen fathers. See An Act to
Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
44. Scott, 60 U.S. at 404.
45. Id. at 404-05.
46. See id. at 410-11.
47. Id. at 411 (referring to constitutional provisions permitting for the importation
of slaves and protecting the property of slave owners).
48. See Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization,in LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS 41, 51 (Mary L. Dudziak & Leti
Volpp eds., 2006) (describing the decision as "inclusive exclusion" since persons of
African descent are excluded from citizenship but also included as American
property).

49. See Scott, 60 U.S. at 449-52.
50. Id. at 451.
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U.S. law, which set the criteria for future citizens beyond descendents
of Chinese migrants. Historically, Chinese migration to the U.S. developed from new global contexts for the U.S. and China, as both
countries became more active in foreign affairs and increasingly subject to foreign influence. 5 1 European and American diplomatic pressure and domestic push-factors spurred Chinese emigration after the
Opium Wars ended in 1842. Public and political forces in the U.S.
have resisted this migration since its increase after 1868. With the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, Chinese migrants were barred from
entry and discriminated against in a variety of ways that affected their
daily life. This included barring Chinese migrants from citizenship
through naturalization, which meant5 2 that they could not become U.S.
citizens after relocating to the U.S.
In this environment of labor need and political exclusion, domestic
law eventually imagined the contours of citizenship with a dispute regarding children born to migrants in the U.S. In Wong Kim Ark, the
Supreme Court held that an individual born to Chinese parents in
U.S. territory was a U.S. citizen. 3 In jurisprudential terms, this confirmed principles of jus soli and birthright citizenship in U.S. law.54 In
cultural terms, the decision's reasoning imagined the contours of the
citizenship community to include persons born in U.S. territory (as
opposed to excluding them from citizenship). Alternatively, the court
could have reasoned that because of naturalization prohibitions on the
contours of citizenship at birth, children born to Chinese migrants are
excluded. With Wong Kim Ark, the community of who is born with
citizenship explicitly includes persons born on U.S. soil, as opposed to
limiting this membership to family relations, i.e., jus sanguinis. As described below, the global migration context from which this developed
and the cultural imagining evident in Wong Kim Ark's reasoning illus51. See generally

CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM

(Amy Kaplan &

Donald E. Pease eds., 1993) (showing sophisticated and varied analyses of how late
nineteenth century and early twentieth century U.S. territorial expansion (continental
and overseas) along with the required foreign relations implied imperial projects).
52. As this Essay is an attempt to place citizenship and migration issues in a cultural and global context, it does not examine the issue of naturalization and citizenship. Importantly though, as judicial interpretation and political determinations
imagined those contours of citizenship, and U.S. law barred naturalization for nonwhites, many persons acquiring U.S. citizenship through a process of naturalization

were required to "prov[e] their whiteness." See

IAN

F.

HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY

37-47 (1996); John Tehranian, Note, Performing Whiteness: NaturalizationLitigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in
America, 109 YALE L.J. 817, 820-21 (2000).
53. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
54. See generally Research in International Law, Harvard Law School, Nationality,
Responsibility of States, TerritorialWaters: Drafts of Conventions Preparedin Anticipation of the First Conference on the Codification of International Law, The Hague,
1930, 23 AM. J. INT'L L. SPECIAL SUPP. 27-29 (1929) (providing a description of the
difference between jus soli (literally the "right of land") and jus sanguinis (literally the
"right of blood")).
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
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trates this Essay's focus on global movement and citizenship's cultural
nuances.
Chinese emigration developed from domestic push factors, overseas
demand, and international pressure. With treaties concluding the
Opium War (1839-1842), China eliminated many restrictions to Chinese emigration and foreign trade. These agreements were part of an
increased European and eventually North American presence in Asia.
This had commercial and geopolitical objectives, motivating treaties
with China. Along with diplomacy leading to concessions like Hong
Kong to Great Britain, the "opening up of China" included ending
bans on emigration and supplying labor outside China. Similarly, domestic Chinese events such as political consolidation after the Taiping
rebellion and a series of bad rice harvests fueled this emigration.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, sizeable populations of
Chinese relocated around the world providing labor as global capitalism developed increasingly commercial enterprises, mostly in the production of primary goods for international consumption.55 Seen from
an American perspective, this migrant labor represents a country with
mostly an Atlantic presence, proceeding to enfranchise the western
regions. Chinese labor was central to the transcontinental railroad
project and to providing a workforce west of the Rocky Mountains.
Between 1852 and 1875 approximately 200,000 Chinese persons relocated to California.5 6 Similar labor movements resulted in Chinese
migrants numbering over 150,000 in Singapore, 90,000 in Peru, 42,000
in Australia, 19,000 in the British West Indies, nearly 5,000 to Cuba,
and similar migration to Mumbai, India, Dutch Guiana, Tahiti, and
Hawai'i.5 7 For these locations, Chinese labored in gold mining, agriculture, spice growing, and cotton.58 As global trade increased, seeking commodities for urban centers and for industrial workforces,
Chinese labor was also global in reach.
In the U.S., Chinese migrants provided a source of labor in the West
after gold was discovered in California in 1848. Chinese labor filled
needs in railroad construction, laundries, and domestic services.5 9
While Chinese began migrating in the 1840s, the majority entered the
U.S. after the Burlingame Treaty between the U.S. and China in 1868.
This treaty provided the U.S. with commercial access to China and it
lifted the ban on emigration for Chinese nationals. The treaty was a
foreign policy gain for the U.S. as the country sought foreign commerce after the Civil War. Likewise, as domestic attention could now
focus on incorporating the western regions, the treaty identified a
55. WOLF, supra note 11, at 374-79.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA
(2004).

THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY
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source of labor. This migration was significant with over 300,000 Chithe U.S. by 1882, with about one-third remaining on
nese relocating to
60
the West Coast.
Chinese migration, despite being the result of domestic labor need
and global movements, unfortunately faced nativist sentiment, racist
discrimination, and reversal to the 1868 treaty's invitations. These
public and civil sentiments fed a series of measures from 1870 onward
as part of the Chinese Exclusion process. Public sentiment was resentful of many immigrants from the period, who came from Southern
and Eastern European countries and Asia, but it also specifically
targeted Chinese. By the end of the nineteenth century, one-third of
the U.S. population was either foreign-born or had at least one foreign
parent. 6' By 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act which
suspended Chinese migration for ten years. 62 In the Act, Congress
codified provisions barring Chinese from becoming U.S. citizens
through naturalization. 63 Congress regarded Chinese as not eligible
for citizenship because they were not "free white persons. ' 64 The
1882 rule barred any state or federal court from naturalizing a Chinese
person, adding to previous federal prohibitions.65
In the 1870 pronouncement, Congress extended the right of naturalization to African-Americans but explicitly prohibited this for Chinese
because of their "undesirable qualities."6 6 Rationales for barring citizenship for Chinese relied on cultural arguments that they were a different race and had a history, biology, and culture unique and so
distinct that they could not assimilate.6 7 It was claimed that these differences threatened U.S. republican governance. 68 Further, federal
measures in 1888 and 1892 barred re-entry for any Chinese who had
U.S. and required registration of all Chinese persons in the
left the
U.S. 69 The Chinese community at grass-roots and strategic litigation
levels publicly opposed the Chinese Exclusion process.
60. Id.
61. Lucy E. Salyer, Wong Kim Ark: The Contest Over Birthright Citizenship, in
IMMIGRATION STORIES 51, 55 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005).
62. An Act to Execute Certain Treaty Stipulations Relating to Chinese, ch. 126,
§ 1, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (1882). The Chinese Exclusion Act also excluded entry for those
not present in the United States by November 17, 1880, or who had arrived within
ninety days of the Act's implementation. Id. § 3.
63. Salyer, supra note 61, at 57.
64. ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58, 61.
65. Salyer, supra note 61, at 57-58.
66. HING, supra note 59, at 36; see Salyer, supra note 61, at 57 (referring to Nevada Senator William Stewart's comments on Chinese as not able to understand the
republican form of government).
67. Salyer, supra note 61, at 57.
68. Id. (referring to Senator John F. Miller's comments on Chinese as "servile
drudges" with limited intellect, accustomed to imperial government, and thus unable
to comprehend or partake in the U.S. republican government).
69. HING, supra note 59, at 39.
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These resistance and litigation efforts resulted in significant court
decisions and lawmaking in the areas of immigration, alienage, and
citizenship law. These struggles included Chinese-Americans articulating their U.S. citizenship while re-entering the U.S. This avoided
border exclusions and rights limitations for Chinese migrants. States
and Congress passed measures excluding Chinese migrants from entry
and increasing the likelihood for their deportation. Executive authority, in the form of border control, increasingly enforced these rules.
The traditional judicial perspective was that most constitutional rights
and judicial review did not apply to immigration law because of the
political branches' "plenary authority." With these forces directly limiting rights for migrants, for many Chinese, articulating their U.S. citizenship provided a method to avoid these harsh measures.
From this context of domestic law limiting rights for Chinese migrants and local resistance from the Chinese community, the Supreme
Court affirmed the principle of birthright citizenship in Wong Kim
Ark.7" Importantly, the decision conceived the contours of U.S. citizenship by birth to include children born in U.S. territory to parents
who are foreign nationals.7 1 Thus, the rationale for community membership (here who can be a citizen) relied on the child's place of birth
instead of their parent's nationality or race. The decision's immediate
effect was to provide de jure incorporation for the U.S.-born children
of Chinese immigrants. The long-term effect, though, was that these
inclusive standards applied to later migrant communities. In Wong
Kim Ark the judicial imagination regarding citizenship migrated away
from race-based exclusions aimed at migrants, away from concerns for
parental lineage in jus sanguinis, and towards an expanded focus on a
child's place of birth.
Wong Kim Ark was born in San Francisco, California, in 1873.72
Both of his parents were Chinese nationals. 73 He lived his whole life
in the U.S. 74 He made two trips to China in 1890 and 1894." 5 Re-

turning from the second journey a year later, he was denied admission
in San Francisco because he was not a U.S. citizen. 76 The port official
reasoned his birth in the U.S. did not provide citizenship. 77 The Government's denial of admission at the port had been planned by the
Department of Justice, responding to public calls since the 1880s to
deny citizenship on jus soli grounds to children born to Chinese migrants." With the aid and litigation support of the Chinese Consoli70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 705 (1898).
Id.
Id. at 650.
Id. at 651.
Salyer, supra note 61, at 66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 66-67.
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dated Benevolent Association, Wong Kim Ark brought suit before the
U.S. district court in San Francisco.7 9 It ruled that he was a U.S. citizen and was illegally detained. 0 After an appeal, the Supreme Court
made its ruling in 1898, avoiding an election year for this socially and
politically divisive issue.
The court ruled in favor of Wong Kim Ark, affirming his U.S. citizenship and the concept of birthright citizenship with six justices in the
majority and two dissenting.8 1 Justice Horace Gray's majority opinion
found that: the law of birthright citizenship was well-established with
centuries of precedent in U.S. and English common law, denying
birthright citizenship would pose enormous problems for children of
many migrant groups beyond the Chinese, and denying citizenship in
these cases posed problems to national sovereignty with sectors of the
population having divergent allegiances. 8" Focusing less on common
law precedent and sovereignty, the dissenting opinion reasoned Chinese could not exercise the allegiance needed for U.S. citizenship.8 3 It
stated their children were "strangers in the land" and the notion of
their citizenship was an "accident of birth."8 4
An important citizenship development since Dred Scott (forty years
prior) was the 1868 implementation of the Fourteenth Amendment
stating "all persons ... born in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside." 85 A clear reading of this provision illustrates
"all persons" born in U.S. territory would be citizens.86 Similarly, at
the time of Wong Kim Ark, jus soli principles were firmly established
in the common law with precedents such as the English Calvin's
Case87 from 1608 and In re Look Tin Sing88 in 1884.89
79. Id. at 67.
80. Id. at 69.
81. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 653-705 (1898).
82. See id. at 694-705.
83. See id. at 731.
84. Id. (Fuller, J.,
dissenting) (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698,
717 (1893)).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In 1866, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act,
stating, "All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States."
See An Act to Protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and
Furnish the Means of Their Vindication, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
86. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 676 ("[U]pon the face of the amendment, as
well as from the history of the times, this was not intended to impose any new restrictions upon citizenship ....").
87. Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1, 4b-6a, 18a, 18b.
88. In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884).
89. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 655-56, 697 (citing Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1,
4b-6a, 18a, 18b (setting anglo-tradition apart from jus sanguinis notions and reasoning jus soli fostered allegiance to the King) and In re Look Tin Sing, 21 F. 905,
908-09 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (holding children born to Chinese parents in the United
States were citizens because of the Fourteenth Amendment)); Salyer, supra note 61,
at 61-62).
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What led to a legal dispute about birthright citizenship after the
Fourteenth Amendment and Look Tin Sing was domestic resistance
and xenophobia to Chinese immigration.9" This migration was global
in that many Chinese left China for domestic reasons there (labor
push) and for domestic reasons in the U.S. (labor demand). Likewise,
it was global as the U.S. negotiated these treaties to open commercial
markets, and the U.S. was increasing its presence in the Pacific and in
the western U.S.
As a legal articulation of this resistance, Chinese Exclusion was an
institutional and long-term process with federal laws enacted in 1882,
1884, 1888, 1892, and 1893. 1' These laws were by no means race neutral and instead specifically targeted Chinese or Asian migrants. Their
rationale in Congress and in many judicial opinions relied on painting
Chinese persons as foreign, impossible to assimilate, a different race,
and obnoxious.92 These cultural arguments provided justifications for
political determinations by Congress when passing measures and by
courts when reviewing these measures.
This Essay argues that legal determinations of who is (or is not) a
U.S. citizen incorporates these cultural notions. Legal interpretations
incorporate these ideas by imagining, or conceiving, who is (or is not)
a member of the citizenship community. Arguments made by litigants, judicial opinions, and the public explicitly relate cultural imaginations of a community's limits with legal determinations of
citizenship. This reasoning occurs by interpreting positive law (such
as naturalization provisions and the Fourteenth Amendment) and
common law precedent. This incorporation of the cultural and community limitations into a legal argument was evident in Dred Scott's
reasoning that African-Americans were not citizens, and they were
property.93
There is a similar process of cultural argumentation entering legal
determinations in Wong Kim Ark, when reasons for excluding the
Chinese become germane to the law of citizenship. These exclusionary reasons represented long-term public and political efforts made
since the 1870s. Responding to this, courts determined if the law clarifying citizenship is as broad as it appears (evident in the Fourteenth
Amendment or in the common law) or if it had implicit distinctions,
i.e., children born to foreign parents in the U.S. are not citizens.
90. See Salyer, supra note 61, at 56-59.
91. See Lucy E. SALYER, LAWS HARSH

AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND
THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAW 1-32 (1995).

92. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 706-07 (1893); Gabriel J.
Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the ConstitutionalLaw
of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1998); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the
Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1592 (2002); see also Leti Volpp, "Obnoxious To
Their Very Nature":Asian Americans and ConstitutionalCitizenship, 8 ASIAN L.J. 71,
79 (2001) (originally published in 5 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 57 (2001)).
93. See supra Section II.
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Arguing against birthright citizenship in Wong Kim Ark, the Government referred to The Slaughter-House Cases9 4 of 1873 and Elk v.
Wilkins95 from the next year. 96 These cases explained that the Fourteenth Amendment's "subject to the jurisdiction of" clause excluded
children born to diplomats and Indians born in tribal jurisdictions
from citizenship, respectively. In both cases, the rationale was that
the children were not fully subject to U.S. jurisdiction. 97 In Wong Kim
Ark, these arguments were used in painting children of foreign nationals born in national territory as not subject to U.S. jurisdiction and
thus not entitled to citizenship by birth. The rationale was extended
to equate voluntary allegiance as required for citizenship. 98 They worried that foreign national parents would not foment the allegiance required for republican governance. 99
Similarly, the Government argued that citizenship entailed something beyond the simple pronouncements in the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 0 It was argued that citizenship could not be based solely on a
shared birth location, i.e., inside domestic territory.' 0 ' Instead the
Government argued a shared characteristic was needed and Chinese
migrants lacked this.10 2 The Government further argued that this
quality was passed from migrants to their children even if they were
born in U.S. territory.' 0 3 Prior legal justifications for this existed in
the ban on Chinese naturalization in 1870. In making these arguments, citizenship was presented as implying a sense of community,
something that did not exist by mere territorial birth. 10 4 This was supplemented with the reasoning from Elk v. Wilkins that Indians were
not completely subject to U.S. jurisdiction, as Indian tribes exercised
some sovereignty. 0 5 The Government further argued that Chinese
migrants, because of their distinct culture and allegiance to a foreign
94. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873).
95. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
96. These cases are referred to heavily in the dissenting opinions. See, e.g., United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 721-24, 727 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (referring to the Slaughter-House Cases). The Government also argued
the Fourteenth Amendment had been forced upon the South and was thus unconstitutional. See Salyer, supra note 61, at 71 (referring to Brief for the United States in
Wong Kim Ark).
97. The majority refutes this claim by referring to the plain meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's phrase, "all persons." See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 675-76.
98. See id. at 707-32 (Fuller, C.J., Harlan, J., dissenting) (examining varying notions of allegiance in common law, international law, U.S. jurisprudence on the Chinese Exclusion Acts and the treaty between the United States and China).
99. See Salyer, supra note 61, at 68-71.
100. Id. at 70-71.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 71-72.
103. Id. at 68.
104. See id. at 68-71.
105. Id. at 71-72.
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state, were similarly not subject to the U.S. jurisdiction."°6 In all
these arguments, the Government averred how cultural notions
marked the contours of citizenship. As such, the limits were imagined
to include or exclude members in a community.
Wong Kim Ark similarly made cultural arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment included a goal of racial equality for citizenship.1" 7 Ark argued this goal was evident in the Amendment's term of
"all persons" and in its clear intent to overturn Dred Scott.10 8 He further argued that jus sanguinis principles, emphasizing family lineage,
lacked common law precedent in U.S. legal history.' 9 Ark claimed
that if citizenship were denied to children born to migrants, a racialized caste would develop, given large immigration to the U.S. 1 0 Likewise by denying citizenship to these persons, a U.S. population with
mixed allegiances could hamper the federal government's power." 1 It
was argued that diverse allegiances by non-citizen children of migrants
would lead to a foreign state involved in U.S. affairs.' 12 If the children
were under the protection of another state, that state could intervene
in matters regarding their treatment. This was specifically undesired
as the U.S. increased its international presence and developed federal
primacy over issues such as migration and foreign relations. Confirming that children born in U.S. territory were citizens provided the federal government control of its territory and border.
V.

CURRENT GLOBAL MEXICO-U.S. MIGRATION AND

Two

IMAGINATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

Migrating on a path reflective of prior histories, specifically slave
trade and Chinese migration, this Essay examines the current migra106. See id. at 68-72.
107. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 692-93 (1898) (highlighting
contemporary jurisprudence finding the Fourteenth Amendment language of "all persons born in . . . the United States" had the intention "to bring all races, without
distinction of color, within the rule" previously limited to the white race (referring to
Benny v. O'Brien, 32 A. 696 (N.J. 1895)); see also Salyer, supra note 61, at 73 (quoting
Briefs for the Appellee submitted by J. Hubley Ashton and Maxwell Evarts).
108. Salyer, supra note 61, at 71-72.
109. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 658-66, 693. Jus sanguinis principles do provide U.S. citizenship for children born to American citizens who reside outside the
United States. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §301, 8 U.S.C.
§1401(c)-(e), (g), (h) (2007) (illustrating how citizenship standards vary if one or both
parents are U.S. citizens and if these parents have resided in the United States).
110. See Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 694 (referring to problems for children of
"English, Scotch, Irish, German, or other European parentage, who have always been
considered and treated as citizens of the United States").
111. See id. at 668 ("Nor can it be doubted that it is the inherent right of every
independent nation to determine for itself, and according to its own constitution and
laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled to its citizenship."); id. at 683-88, 690
(correlating the importance of an independent U.S. government with the importance
to determine citizenship).
112. See id. at 685-86, 690.
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tion and national identity discourse for citizenship in Mexican and
U.S. law. U.S.-Mexico 13 migration develops from global and transnational forces. Responding to this domestic law for both Mexico and
the U.S. re-imagines citizenship. To explain this, this section first describes the transnational and global aspects of current migration that
spurs citizenship debates in the U.S. and Mexico. Next, two sub-sections respectively relate the concept of imagined communities with legal citizenship changes in Mexico and political suggestions to revisit
jus soli citizenship in the U.S.
This Essay's transnational view of migration contradicts a perspective that one country is solely the cause of or unilaterally has the
power to control migration. Immigration (the process of crossing a
national border and relocating) clearly reflects international causes,
influences, and effects. With Mexico-U.S. migration, the pattern
since the mid-1980s is characterized by factors such as increased U.S.
migrant labor dependence (pull factor) and increased Mexican dependence on emigrant labor (push factor), and economic restructuring in
the U.S. and Mexico illustrating bilateral integration and globalization. These factors continue historic migration and transnational
trends between the two neighbors.' 1 4 In particular since immigration
reforms in 1986, with the Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA), and in 1996, with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA)," 5 immigration to the United
States has increased. This results in migrants remaining in the U.S., as
opposed to returning home, given tougher border control and limited
legal immigration options. For both the U.S. (as a receiving-state) and
113. This Essay refers to the migration process between the United States and
Mexico with two identifications, "Mexico-U.S. migration" and "U.S.-Mexico migration." I use two terms, by reversing the order of the countries, in order to emphasize
that the causes and effects of migration are on both sides of the international border.
This avoids a characterization of migration being solely caused by the United States's
demand for labor or border policy; or the Mexican labor supply, demographics, or
wage differentials.
114. Transnational influences in migration between the United States and Mexico
and in Mexican nationality are historic, characterizing much of the migration in the
early twentieth century. See DAVID FITZGERALD, NEGOTIATING EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CITIZENSHIP: MEXICAN MIGRATION AND THE TRANSNATIONAL POLITICS OF

COMMUNITY 17-42 (2000).
115. IIRIRA eliminated many migrant rights and initiated the current focus of migration control through border security. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET
AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 440-42, 446-51, 529-33,
609-16 (5th ed. 2003). The comprehensive bill contained provisions which created
three and ten-year bars to re-entry for aliens who were "unlawfully present," id. at
440; "expedited removals," id. at 530; and changes to eligibility for suspension of deportation, see id. at 609-10. See also Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of
the 1996 DeportationLaws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1936 (2000) (discussing increasing removability classification for alien-criminals,
mandatory detention for immigrants convicted of certain crimes, and statutory limitations to judicial review over immigration law claims under the IIRIRA).
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Mexico (as a sending-state) consistent and long-term migration experiences result in domestic law re-imagining citizenship.
Briefly stated, after these increases in migration, Mexican law
16
changed in 1997 to permit dual-nationality for Mexican citizens.'
This change to dual-nationality is a product of re-imagining Mexican
identity. Similarly, in the U.S., limited popular sectors question jus
soli legal principles as they relate to children born to immigrants. Recent domestic reactions to immigration have questioned the concept
of who can be a U.S. citizen. This results in legislative efforts to alter
current jus soli practices. Specifically, U.S. questions regard migrants
lacking government authority to be in the U.S. In popular discourse
they are referred to as "undocumented aliens.""' 7 The national identity question is: whether children born to unauthorized migrants in
U.S. territory are U.S. citizens or not? The established interpretation
is that Wong Kim Ark affirms any child born to foreign national parents in U.S. territory is a citizen.'" 8 With case law and practice since
1898, birthright citizenship is the legal norm. This judicial interpretation is not limited to "authorized" or "legal" migrants. This Essay
argues that current popular efforts to limit jus soli to children born to
authorized migrants, legal permanent residents, or other changes to
the jus soli regime are examples of culturally re-imagining citizenship.
Like legal responses in Dred Scott to the slave trade and in Wong Kim
Ark to Chinese migration, these calls to re-visit birthright citizenship
illustrate re-imagining U.S. citizenship in response to migration.
Here, the global force is migration patterns since the 1980s.
This section first proceeds by describing the global and transnational process of immigration to the U.S. and specifically how migration from Mexico is so significant to this process. This makes the
birthright citizenship not necessarily intrinsically tied to Mexican im116. See Nuria GonzAlez Martfn, Ley de Nacionalidad, 98 REVISTA JURIDICA:
873, 873-94 (2000), available at
http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/librev/rev/boletin/cont/98/el/elll.pdf (explaining that the reform's motivation was for Mexicans in the United States to not lose
legal rights as Mexicans and to inspire their naturalization as U.S. citizens to combat
anti-immigrant measures).
117. The law's use of the terms "aliens" and "undocumented" creates a discriminatory bias in issues involving foreign nationals even before any substantive law is examined. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 1-2 (4th ed. 2005) (arguing for the use of the word "noncitizen" because
"alien" strikes a "disturbing chord"); Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTERAM. L. REV. 263, 264 (1996-1997) (arguing the term "alien" creates "an institutionalized other," different and apart from "us" and that this classification has important
legal, social, and political impacts).
118. 7 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE
§ 92.03[2][a] (rev. ed. 2007); see also id. § 92.03[2][d] (describing the current exceptions to this jus soli rule, which are based on common law precedent, of children born
to diplomats, on foreign public vessels, and to alien enemies in U.S. territory in hostile
occupation).
BOLETIN MEXICANO DE DERECHO COMPARADO
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migrants, but the issue does overwhelmingly influence the citizenship
of their children. While all immigrants to the U.S. are not from Mexico, the country is the site of origin for a majority of immigrants. Significant migrant populations do come from other countries and often
exercise more numeric and qualitative influence in certain U.S. regions. But the effect of any change to birthright citizenship would
weigh heavily on migrant families of Mexican descent. Next, this section describes how legal changes responding to this migration illustrate a re-imagination of citizenship. These changes include a
Mexican dual-nationality legal regime and recent popular questions
about birthright citizenship in the U.S.
The U.S. currently receives 1.2 million immigrants per year. 119 The
total immigrant population in the United States is estimated to be 33.5
million.120 It is estimated that the total unauthorized migrant population residing in national territory is 11.5 to 12 million, with 56% or 6.2
million being from Mexico. 21 The current migrant population in the
U.S. does not have one sole cause and is not sustained by a single
factor. Migrants come to the U.S. because of transnational socio-economic networks that feed and sustain the flow, socio-economic disruptions at the point of origin, and labor demand in the U.S. Given the
high percentage of Mexican migrants in the U.S. immigrant
demographics and this Essay's focus on migration as a transnational
global force, this Essay highlights how Mexico plays into national
identity debates for the domestic law from both the receiving and
sending contexts.
Like with prior examples, Mexico-U.S. migration initiates with
world-system factors. Specifically, as economic markets for resources,
production, and sales extend from the center to the periphery, labor
markets in the periphery are disrupted. This pushes labor in the periphery to seek new opportunities abroad. This migration is a natural
outgrowth of inevitable disruptions and dislocations in capitalist development.1 22 With our example, the U.S. economy represents the
119. This number is based on analysis of figures from 2004. See generally JEFFREY
S. PASSEL & ROBERTO SURO, PEW HISPANIC CTR., RISE, PEAK AND DECLINE:
TRENDS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION 1992-2004, RESEARCH REPORT (Sept. 25, 2005) (show-

ing that for much of the 1990s, a little more than 1.1 million migrants came to the
United States per year, peaking to a little higher than 1.5 million in 1999 and 2000),
available at http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/reports/53.pdf.

120. LUKE J. LARSEN, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, RESEARCH REPORT 1 (Aug.
2004) (referring to 2003 estimates on "civilian noninstitutionalized" persons in the
United States "who were not U.S. citizens at birth"), available at http://www.census.
gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-551.pdf.

121. See JEFFREY

S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR., THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTIC
U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON
THE MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, RESEARCH REPORT i (Mar. 7,
OF THE UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE

2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf.
122. See MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION, supra note 14, at 34-37 (summarizing world-system theory migration perspectives).
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core and Mexico is the periphery. Migration is a historic process that
happens at a global scale and is the product of economic development,
versus being the sole result of wage-differential or local poverty. As
presented by Eric R.Wolf, Douglas S. Massey, and J. Edward Taylor,
global history shows large-scale and far-reaching migration was extremely common until World War I.123 The forces that initiated global
migration then are not too different from the current causes of migration. As the core/center industrialized and developed urban centers,
workers from all over the world moved seeking demand in labor. This
happened at the same time that capital, raw materials, and manufactured goods crossed borders, often within the core-periphery
trajectory.
U.S.-Mexico migration rests on two national histories and two
economies deeply engrained in mutual influence. This context explains why so much of the cause, continuance, and effect of migration
is not solely domestic. For instance, the U.S. invaded Mexico more
than three times since its independence in the early nineteenth century. The U.S.'s current "West" is comprised of over one-third of
Mexico's previous territory. While Mexico is the U.S.'s second largest
trading partner, the U.S. is Mexico's largest supplier of capital and
market for its exports.
Applying a world-systems approach to the Mexico-U.S. migration,
dislocations and disruptions in local economies come to light. Massey,
et al. summarized how evidence from changes in industrialization and
agriculture, both inter-connected to overseas markets, produce labor
disruptions in Mexican communities.' 2 4 This global-meets-local phenomenon is compounded by demographic and agrarian limits. Social
science research of specific migrant-sending communities shows how
people seek employment opportunities abroad after options at home
are nonexistent, prices in basic goods at home increase, or access to
capital at home is unavailable. Economic development shifts efficiencies relying on comparative advantages, which results in employment
opportunities being eliminated. Mexico-U.S. migration is not the result of poverty in Mexico but instead is a product of economic development and consequential dislocations. 2 5
123. See Douglas S. Massey & J. Edward Taylor, Back to the Future: Immigration
Research, Immigration Policy, and Globalization in the Twenty-First Century, in INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION: PROSPECTS AND POLICIES IN A GLOBAL MARKET 373,
373-78 (Douglas S. Massey & J. Edward Taylor eds., 2004); WOLF, supra note 11, at 4,
23.
124. See MASSEY ET AL., WORLDS IN MOTION, supra note 14, at 92-93.
125. See Douglas S. Massey, Five Myths About Immigration: Common Misconceptions Underlying U.S. Border-Enforcement Policy, 4 IMMIGR. POL'Y IN Focus 1, 1
(Aug. 2005), available at http://caimmigrant.org/repository/?m=2005&paged=2 (follow
"Five Myths About Immigration" hyperlink) (disqualifying the immigration myths
that: 1) a migrant home country's lack of economic development causes migration, 2)
rapid population growth in a home country causes migration, 3) wage differential primarily motivates migrants, 4) migrants relocate to the United States because of its
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A.

On the Migrant-Sending End, Mexico's Citizenship
Re-Imagination Embraces Dual-Citizenship

For Mexico, economic liberalization since 1988 and NAFTA in 1994
represent the economic changes linking local communities to a global
economy. This spurs migration. Enrique Dussel has examined how
economic liberalization in Mexico influences potential migratory patterns. 2 6 He showed how liberalization in Mexico by 1994, which was
responding to the devaluation crisis of 1982, resulted in controlled inflation, decreased fiscal deficits, and enormous inflows of foreign capital. 127 The macro economic changes, though, did not alleviate wage
and employment pressures in Mexico. 128 Dussel showed how workers' real wages have decreased since liberalization and how the number of Mexicans lacking formal employment has grown.' 29 Similarly,
U.S. immigrant-labor demand remains structurally embedded and
provides an offset for disruptions in Mexico. 3 The relevant relationship for this Essay is that international economics (NAFTA, international trade, and liberalization) results in employment pressures and
falling real wages. These two factors reify how transnational factors
spur Mexico-U.S. migration.
In 1997, Mexico reformed its nationality law to permit Mexican nationals to become dual nationals.'3 1 In Mexico "nationality" and "citizenship" are governed by Articles XXX, XXXVII, and XXVIII of the

Constitution and the

LEY DE NACIONALIDAD

(Nationality Law) en-

acted in 1993.132 There is a legal distinction in Mexico between nationality and citizenship. Mexican nationality, or "[ser] mexicano"
("[to be] a Mexican"), is provided for before citizenship, or "cipublic benefits, and 5) migrants intend to settle permanently in the United States).
See generally Douglas S. Massey, Seeing Mexican Immigration Clearly, CATO UNBOUND, Aug. 20, 2006, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2006/08/20/douglas-s-massey/seeing-mexican-immigration-clearly/ (showing that migration is a natural result of
economic development; that migration is not, even for unauthorized migrants, increasing in numbers or a "wave" since the 1980s; that migration does not have causes
in Mexican poverty since Mexico's per capita income at $10,000 and male life expectancy at 73 years are both in the upper tier of middle income countries; and that most
migration is motivated by micro or home economic objectives of acquiring a home,
capital for a business, or other investments).
126. See Enrique Dussel Peters, Recent StructuralChanges in Mexico's Economy: A
PreliminaryAnalysis of Some Sources of Mexican Migration to Mexico, in CROSSINGS:
MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 55, 55-74 (Marcelo M.
Su~rez-Orozco ed., 1998).
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. See Wayne A. Cornelius, The Structural Embeddedness of Demand for Mexican Immigration Labor: New Evidence from California, in CROSSINGS: MEXICAN IMMIGRATION IN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES,

115, 115-44 (Marcelo M. Su~rez-

Orozco ed., 1998).
131. Jorge A. Vargas, Dual Nationality for Mexicans, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823,
839-42 (1998).
132. Id.
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' 3 A Mexican
udadania."13
national may only attain citizenship at the

age of 18 years, which provides the right to vote.1 34 Before this age,
an individual is a national but not a citizen. With that said, a Mexican
citizen is not barred by Mexican law from naturalizing as a U.S. citizen. As such, dual-citizenship is permitted under Mexican law. But

more accurately, the actual legal reforms affect Mexican nationality.
Dual-nationality reforms were enacted by Mexico so its nationals
abroad could retain their Mexican nationality if they acquired another

nationality, such as U.S. citizenship. 35 A primary motivation for
these changes was to encourage Mexican nationals to influence U.S.

immigration lawmaking as U.S. citizens. 136 Previously, Mexico was legally hostile, and denied Mexican nationality to any Mexican national
who naturalized in another country.1 37 These laws had a very nationalist goal and reflected Mexican attitudes of official disdain for Mexi-

can-Americans that regarded Mexican immigrants in the U.S. as
"Chaqueteros" (traitors).

38

With reforms to Mexican law, these Mex-

ican nationals would not fear losing their Mexican nationality. By
changing its domestic legal regime regarding who can or cannot claim
Mexican nationality, Mexico sought to increase the capacity Mexicans
had to influence U.S. immigration policy.
The changes were initially announced in March 1997 with amend-

ments to Articles XXX, XXXII, and XXXVII of the Constitution, es133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See David Fitzgerald, Rethinking Emigrant Citizenship, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 90,
95 (2006) (noting that since 1993, Mexico's nationality law required adult Mexican
nationals born abroad to choose between Mexican nationality and their second
nationality).
136. Several sources provide analysis on Mexican reforms to nationality law and
their influence. See generally David Fitzgerald, "For 118 Million Mexicans":
Emigrants and Chicanos in Mexican Politics, in DILEMMAS OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN
MEXICO 523, 531-33 (Kevin J. Middlebrook ed., 2004) (stating these reforms were
done by Mexico "with little fear" of sovereignty concerns and with active promotion
of dual nationality); Martfn, supra note 116, at 873-94 (2000) (explaining that the
reform's motivation was for Mexicans in the United States to not lose legal rights as
Mexicans and to inspire their naturalization as U.S. citizens to combat anti-immigrant
measures); Alfredo Corchado, Zedillo Seeking Closer Ties with Mexican-Americans,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Apr. 8, 1995, at All; Mark Fineman, Mexican Citizens May
Gain Right to Dual Nationality,L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, at 1; Mexico Passes Law on
Dual-Citizenship,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1996, at A8 (reporting that a primary motive
for Mexico's dual-nationality law was to create a political U.S. lobby and counter-act
anti-immigrant forces). Most recently there have been discussions of proposing a
Congressional district in Mexico's legislature for migrants in the United States. See
Patrick J. McDonnell, Fox Vows Better Ties with Mexican Immigrants in the U.S., L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2000, at B1.
137. See Jorge G. Castafieda, U.S. Policy Shift Wakes Up the Neighbors, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at B5 (explaining that Mexico's nationality law heavily discouraged Mexicans to naturalize abroad, discussing Mexico's ambivalence to MexicanAmericans and migrants in the United States, and noting how these positions have
changed in reaction to United States's restrictionist efforts).
138. See Vargas, supra note 131, at 823-24.
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tablishing that no Mexican by birth would forfeit his or her nationality
because he or she had double or multiple nationalities. 139 The introduction of the non-forfeiture right opened the door for Mexicans to
have two nationalities without fear of losing their Mexican nationality,
effectively creating a "dual-nationality" regime. Enacting legislation
was later implemented in March 1998 with reforms to the Nationality
Law, Ley de Nacionalidad 4 ° Most recently amended in March 1997,
Article XXX states methods to attain Mexican nationality, or to be a
"Mexicano," is by birth or by naturalization. 4 1 In addition to persons
born in Mexican territory, the amendment clarifies the category of
"Mexicans by birth" to include children born outside national territory to Mexican national parents who were born in national territory
or to naturalized Mexican nationals. 42 Article XXXVII provides the
heart of the dual-nationality project by stating no Mexican by birth
may lose his or her Mexican nationality. 4 3 This is expanded upon in
the Nationality Law, which guarantees that Mexicans will not
lose
14
their Mexican nationality after acquiring another nationality.
The dual-nationality regime implies a re-imagining of who is a Mexican national. Current imagination deviates from prior nationalistic
perspectives. Previous legal reasoning set a clear line between attaining a foreign nationality and remaining a Mexican national. With a
large percentage of Mexican nationals residing abroad, spurred by the
global forces of migration, Mexican law eventually adapted to include
them as nationals. Nationality was redefined culturally to include
139. See Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as
amended, art. XXX, XXXII, XXXVII Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [D.O.], 5 de
Febrero de 1917 (Mex.), translated in 12 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 2004).
140. Ley de Nacionalidad [Nationality Law], as amended, Diario Oficial de la
Federaci6 [D.0.], 23 de Enero de 1998 (Mex.), available at http://www.sre.gob.mx/
tramites/nacionalidad/leynacionalidad.htm; Martfn, supra note 116, at 873.
141. Gonz~ilez Martfn reports that prior reforms to Article XXX (in 1934, 1969, and
1974) created a naturalization process, provided for Mexican nationality to children
born to Mexican mothers abroad, and provided for non-Mexican men married to
Mexican women to acquire Mexican nationality by naturalization. Martfn, supra note
116, at 876.
142. The Mexican nationality legal regime recognizes two manners of attaining
Mexican nationality: by descent or birth to Mexican national parents Gus sanguinis)
and by birth in Mexican territory (us soli). See Constituci6n Polftica de los Estados
Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 137, at art. XXX. Amendments to Article XXXII specifically prohibited foreigners from holding public office, such as federal deputy, federal senator, president, or state governor. See id. art. XXXII.
143. Id. art. XXXVII.
144. Two specific categories of dual nationals are identified: 1) Mexicans by birth
who acquired another nationality before March 20, 1998, which previous to this law
resulted in the loss of Mexican nationality, and 2) Mexicans by birth who have the
right to another nationality after March 20, 1998. Ley de Nacionalidad, supra note
140. The process for certifying dual nationality is readily explained at the Mexican
consulate webpages. See, e.g., The Mexican Consulate of Austin, http://www.sre.gob.
mx/austin/ (click on left sidebar link "Documentaci6n Consular") (last visited Apr. 4,
2008).
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those abroad and with other nationalities. Both the Mexican state and
civil society benefited economically from this migration. Remittances-earnings for migrant labor abroad-provided families a
source of capital. Migrant-nationals working abroad provided an offset for public pressure to increase employment opportunities and/or
wages. With this political and economic context and a society increasingly exposed to globalization forces, Mexican nationality is culturally
re-conceived to embrace migrants abroad. The immediate impetus for
this was discriminatory treatment nationals received abroad in the
U.S., especially after California's Proposition 187 and then IIRIRA.
B.

On the Labor Demand End, U.S. Forces Urge Re-Imagining
Citizenship Based on "Consent" to Negate
Birthright Citizenship

From a destination for migration, U.S. public and political forces
reacting to migration since the 1980s have called for a legal re-imagination of citizenship. This is specifically evident in debates about
birthright citizenship. For some sectors of society, these questions
arise despite established legal determinations from over a century ago
made about birth in domestic territory and citizenship from the Fourteenth Amendment and Wong Kim Ark. In particular, these forces
question whether children born to unauthorized migrants are citizens.
Unauthorized migration is a product of global force, with causes, effects, and influences in sending-countries and in the U.S. This migration resembles the transnational movements in people from the
transatlantic slave trade and from late-nineteenth century Chinese migration to the U.S. Responding to these migrations, U.S. law
imagined citizenship with positive and common law determinations,
such as constitutional amendments, court decisions, and naturalization
acts. These citizenship determinations rested on cultural reasoning,
articulating how commonly held beliefs set the law's inclusive and exclusive boundaries.
The process replicates itself presently with public concern about
birthright citizenship since the 1980s. The current effort to re-imagine
birthright citizenship focuses on the concepts of consent and citizenship. The simple argument is: attaining U.S. citizenship requires consent from the polity, as opposed to individuals having citizenship
ascribed (i.e., provided) to them merely by birth on U.S. soil. Here,
because their parents lack de jure authorization to reside in the U.S.,
children of unauthorized migrants lack official consent to be citizens.
This argument removes citizenship as required by birth in U.S. territory, norms explicit in the Fourteenth Amendment and Wong
Kim
145
Ark, and instead raises the significance of the state's consent.
145. Several articles have addressed the idea that U.S. citizenship is not based on a
strictly consensual founding. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citi-
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This sub-section proceeds by describing how the recent issue of consent for citizenship illustrates a cultural concern for who is or is not a
member of the imagined community of U.S. citizens. This re-imagining resembles efforts from 150 and 110 years ago, suggesting a consistent and historic discourse in the law between migration and
imagining citizen members. Next, this sub-section briefly summarizes
the recent calls to re-imagine birthright citizenship and the responses
affirming birthright citizenship's settled nature in U.S. law. Accordingly, this Essay argues birthright citizenship is settled in U.S. law; but
the social, political, and cultural efforts to re-visit the issue are expected, reflective of past trends, and deeply cultural. Migration forces
domestic society and its law to question the community parameters in
terms of race, ethnicity, and consent implicit or irrelevant to authorized migration.
The issue of consent is particularly tangible since unauthorized migrants are viewed by some as lacking the consent to reside in the U.S.
Judicial opinions commenting on birthright citizenship characterize
such a citizen as "accidental," 1 '4 6 in Wong Kim Ark from 110 years ago,
and "presumed," in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld a4 7 from four years ago.148
Those advocating for an overturn of jus soli principles in U.S. law relate the "accident" or "presumption," which in reality is birth in U.S.
territory, with a lack of consent.
This concern has received much attention since 1985, when Peter H.
Schuck and Rogers M. Smith published the book Citizenship Without
Consent: Illegal Aliens in the American Polity.1 49 Schuck and Smith
explained that jus soli principles could not be compatible with republican principles basing citizenship on consent. 150 Jus soli principles relied on prior reasoning that a subject born in feudal territory would be
its subject.15 1 Given the U.S. Constitution's consensual nature, birthright citizenship is painted as "a bastard concept in American ideology." 15' 2 Schuck and Smith's goal in 1985 was to provide a more
zenship and the Constitution,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 54, 66-73 (1997) (presenting the consensus principle as too limited and instead proposing a response principle between
state and individual for citizenship); David A. Martin, Membership and Consent: Abstract and Organic?, 11 YALE J. INT'L L. 278 (1985) (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK &
ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985), and explaining that, in the United States, citizenship relies on
both ascriptive and consensual processes, and further providing a comparative analysis of how a strict consensus approach excludes children of immigrants in many European states, creating a sort of voluntary apartheid).
146. See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) (Fuller, C.J., Harlan,
J., dissenting).
147. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 554.
149. PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT:
ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985).
150. See id. at 20-23.
151. See id. at 13-17.
152. Id. at 2.
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legitimate theory of consensual citizenship and to address problems of
"illegal aliens."' 53 Along with reinterpreting the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to nullify the Constitutional authority of birthright citizenship
for children born to "illegal" or temporary visitors, they proposed enforcing immigration laws and employer sanctions, but increasing admission opportunities.1 54 They argued the Amendment's clause of

"subject to the jurisdiction [of the U.S.]" required complete jurisdiction to the U.S. and this meant citizenship required consent from the

state. 1 55 Their perspective gained popular, political, and legislative at-

tention in the 1990s, but never resulted in any reversal of the jus soli
and Wong Kim Ark interpretations. By 1995, though, ten years after

the failed effort to decrease migration
in 1986's IRCA, the position
1 56
lost some immediate strength.
In 2004, birthright citizenship gained renewed attention with the Su-

preme Court case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld. This case involved a U.S. citizen, Yaser Hamdi, who was born in domestic territory, Louisiana, to
Saudi Arabian parents who were temporarily present in the U.S. in
non-immigrant status. Not residing in the U.S. since his birth and
relocating to Afghanistan as an adult, Mr. Hamdi surrendered to U.S.

armed forces, who determined he was an enemy combatant. He was
transferred to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantdinamo Bay, Cuba. After

his family filed a writ of habeas corpus for his release, the Supreme
Court ruled that as a citizen he had the right to challenge the basis for
his classification as an enemy combatant and consequent detention. 157
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion briefly, but clearly, refers to Hamdi
as a "presumed citizen."1'58 This undoubtedly followed the suggestions by amicus curiae arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment does

not provide citizenship for persons born in U.S. territory who lack
allegiance to the U.S.1 59

153. See id. at 5-7, 37-41.
154. Id. at 5, 116-22.
155. Id. at 74-89.
156. Testifying before Congress, Peter Schuck explained that birthright citizenship,
despite its problems, is a "pragmatic accommodation" to the failures of border and
interior enforcement of immigration law. Societal and Legal Issues Surrounding Children Born in the United States to Illegal Alien Parents:J. Hearing on H.R. 705, H.R.
1363, H.J. Res. 56, H.J. Res. 64, H.J. Res. 87, H.J. Res. 88, and H.J. Res. 93 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims and the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 95 (1995) [hereinafter Joint Hearing] (statement of Prof. Peter H. Schuck).
157. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509, 511 (2004).
158. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence in Support of Respondents at 6, 16, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 871165 (arguing the text of the Fourteenth Amendment requires both birth in domestic territory and jurisdictional allegiance for a Constitutional right to Citizenship, Wong Kim Ark should be narrowly read to conform
with "the original understanding of the Citizenship Clause," and current interpreta-
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The Hamdi events brought the citizenship issue into light as the
U.S. reacted to the September 11, 2001, attacks with an international
and domestic "War on Terror." As a citizen, Mr. Hamdi enjoyed
more substantive and procedural rights than the hundreds of other
detainees in Guantinamo. The issue of facing a "foreign threat" and
the "need for government authority" to combat this were added to the
imagination of U.S. citizenship. This citizenship issue is painted as urgent given the insecurity post-September 11 and the possible circumstance that a citizen could more easily breach civil security than a
foreign national would be able to.
Interestingly, the argument of consent as lacking for birthright citizenship gained a textual argument after the Hamdi dispute. Legal
scholar John C. Eastman added to the Schuck and Rogers perspective
by arguing that the established interpretation of jus soli was not "in
accord with the original understanding of the Citizenship clause."1 6
The "original understanding" is claimed to require allegiance to the
U.S., which temporary visitors and unauthorized migrants lack. Two
things suggest this understanding. First is legislative history of the
clause, implying a limitation to the amendment's textual statement of
broadly including "all persons born in the U.S."' 6 1 Second is jurisprudence on the "subject to the jurisdiction" provision concerning Native
Americans, before Wong Kim Ark, which is more relevant since unaulike Native Americans may have allegiances to anthorized migrants
162
other country.
Since the mid-1980s when the birthright citizenship issue re-entered
public discourse, scholarly response and dialogue has been extensive,
detailed, and varied. Much of this exchange builds on the idea that
Wong Kim Ark and common law jus soli principles make birthright
citizenship, in line with the Fourteenth Amendment, the established
interpretation in constitutional law. Advocates such as Eastman,
Schuck, and Rogers, explain these interpretations should be revisited. 6 3 Central arguments against the consent-focused and originaltion of the decision is incompatible with "theory of government by consent" used by
the authors of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment).
160. See John C. Eastman, Born in the U.S.A.? Rethinking BirthrightCitizenship in
the Wake of 9/11: Oversight Hearing on Dual Citizenship, Birthright Citizenship, and
the Meaning of Sovereignty Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, BorderSecurity and
Claims of the H. Comm. of the Judiciary,109th Cong. 61 (2005) (testimony of John C.
Eastman, Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law, Director, the Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=905570.
161. See id. at 62-64 (referring to comments by Senator Lyman Trumbull, James
Doolittle, and Jacob Howard).
162. See id. at 62-69 (arguing that instead of the current interpretation based on
Wong Kim Ark that citizenship should be denied for children of non-immigiants and
authorized immigrants based upon the Slaughter-House Cases and Elk).
163. See id. at 60-61 (stating the "generally-accepted interpretation" should be "reinterpreted... with the original understanding"); SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 149,
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ist-perspectives are that the Fourteenth Amendment broadly confers
citizenship to children born in the U.S.; this is supported by legislative
history and the intent to overrule Dred Scott; the common law incorporates jus soli principles with limited exceptions that do not include
unauthorized migrants; and foreign nationals who are illegally present
are surely "subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S."' 6 4 Similarly, schol-

ars point to the discriminatory nature, in terms of race, ethnicity, and
nationality, of overturning any jus soli principles.' 65
The public and political calls to re-visit birthright citizenship, either
by reviving judicial interpretations from before Wong Kim Ark or by a

Constitutional amendment, imply a process of re-imagining U.S. citizenship. On its face, such a legal maneuver upsets a history of over
110 years of birthright citizenship in the U.S. Similarly, it adds a con-

sent-focus to legal applications of Fourteenth Amendment that were
rejected by Wong Kim Ark's holding, but argued by the Government.
At that point in history, public and political pressure complained

about Chinese migrants in veins extremely similar to current restrictionist, xenophobic, or anti-immigrant stances.
The consent theory directly addresses how the state and the polity
envision who may belong to the community of citizens. This process is
intimately cultural as it clearly articulates what is the communal set of
beliefs. Retracting jus soli justifications imagines these barriers to correlate (literally imagine) the immigration status of a child's parents
with consent for citizenship (or not) of the child. Put in legal terms,
the immigration practice concerns of a foreign national's potential inat 5-7 (proposing a reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship
Clause).
164. Foreign nationals and their children, despite being unauthorized to reside in
the United States or being the children of the former country, are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §212(a), 8
U.S.C. §1182 (2007) (setting forth grounds for inadmissibility from the United States);
§237(a), 8 U.S.C. §1227 (setting forth grounds for deportability from the United
States). This involves not only removal from the United States, but often includes
being detained or subject to executive authority. See Morawetz, supra note 115, at
1947-48. Likewise, an alien is subject to criminal punishment for immigration law
violations. Id. at 1943-46. For specific exceptions in common law to jus soli, see
GORDON ET AL., supra note 118, § 92.03[2][d]. See generally Joint Hearing, supra
note 156, at 105-09 (Statement by Prof. Gerald Neuman); Gerald L. Neuman, Back to
Dred Scott?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 485, 488-96 (1987) (reviewing PETER H. SCHUCK
& ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE
AMERICAN POLITY (1985)).
165. See Mae M. Ngai, Birthright Citizenship and the Alien Citizen, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2521, 2523 (2007) (summarizing the state of the current birthright citizenship
debate, with a particular focus on how some citizens historically receive suspect treatment given racialized identity of an immigrant ancestry, including examples from
nineteenth century African-Americans, Chinese-Americans, and Mexican-Americans); Kevin Johnson, Note, The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A Threat to
Equality, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1028-29 (1994) (presenting how contemporary
proposals for a constitutional amendment rejecting birthright citizenship would conflict with constitutional equality principles).
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admissibility, unlawful presence, deportability, or deviation from a
condition of entry (for instance a change of employer's ownership or
errors in professional licensing documentation), imply his or her children's lack of consent to be citizens. There is a quite a literal imagining or conjuring up of immigration law status with political theory
about citizenship. This perspective literally envisions a parent's immigration status, which belongs to the opaque bureaucratic and Kafkian
complexity of the Immigration and National Act or its corresponding
regulations, as determining their child's potential for citizenship.
These claims are made even though the jus soli reasoning explicit in
the Fourteenth Amendment's clear wording of "all persons born" and
Wong Kim Ark explain otherwise.
There is another communal imagination element evident in the relationship between immigrants and their children and a society and its
youth. As the issue places a wedge between immigrants and their children becoming citizens, rejecting birthright citizenship literally conceives of limits for new and future generations. These limits (one
cannot be a citizen because of parental immigration status) are
steeped in concerns for inequality under the law. Twenty-five years
ago, when deciding children of unauthorized migrants were entitled to
public education in Plyler v. Doe,1 6 6 the Supreme Court rejected such
notions of inequality167 for children who had no responsibility for their
immigration status.
VI.

CONCLUSION

This Essay is written at the end of 2007 and near the beginning of
2008. These two years mark 200 years since the end of England's
transatlantic slave trade, 150 years since the Dred Scott decision, and
110 years since Wong Kim Ark. Viewed quickly, the three events suggest how the movement in persons (slave trade and Chinese migration) is transnational, and eventually responding to them, domestic
law determines who may (or not) become a citizen. This Essay uses
analytical tools from Anderson's imagined communities to identify
how national identity, in the form of citizenship, is conceived within
these historic examples. It then uses similar analysis to examine the
migration and citizenship law discourse evident in contemporary U.S.
and Mexican law.
In all the instances explored, there is a clear suggestion that global
and transnational forces initiate migration. For the slave trade, this
was European and North American power transporting persons from
Africa to the Western Hemisphere. For Chinese migration, it was the
166. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
167. Id. at 212 n.10 ("[N]o plausible distinction with respect to Fourteenth Amendment 'jurisdiction' can be drawn between resident aliens whose entry into the United
States was lawful, and resident aliens whose entry was unlawful.").
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imperial projects of the U.S. in Asia and in the western part of the
American continent. Examining the migration dynamic between the
U.S. and Mexico, this force is the bilateral supply of and push for labor. As we currently experience migration, it is sustained by transnational socio-economic networks.
After this migration occurs there is an eventual legal determination
of who can or cannot be a citizen. This Essay suggests this legal question often rests on cultural notions. In the Dred Scott decision rejecting that blacks may be citizens, the cultural reasoning involved
retrograde views of who was civilized or not and who literally was
property belonging to another person. In the Chinese Exclusion process, the cultural arguments explicit in the law stated Chinese persons
could not assimilate, could not participate in republican governance,
and were "obnoxious." Wong Kim Ark refutes these notions in the
law by holding that children of migrants born on U.S. soil are entitled
to birthright citizenship. The Supreme Court was motivated by the
negative prospects of having immigrants' children with mixed allegiances and/or unable to participate in the republican process.
With more recent immigration, Mexican law on the sending end has
re-imagined its parameters to permit dual-citizenship. This is a cultural process envisioning the nation as not limited by territorial
bounds. On the other side of the migration dynamic, the U.S. is the
recipient of labor that seeks its high demand. The law has not
changed to reject birthright citizenship. But political and public calls
for this are constant and developed. This Essay argues these efforts
are reactions to a global and transnational process. Similarly, by adding consent-based theories to citizenship, refuting a broad and inclusive legal history of jus soli, and refuting an equal future for children,
they re-imagine citizenship.
In sum, painting in broad strokes over a canvas that is long and
wide in history, this Essay poses new questions about migration and
citizenship. This is done by highlighting the transnational elements of
migration and by tracking the cultural process embedded in the law
determining who is (or is not) a citizen.
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